Independent planning risk analysis
Further information response: solar farm and energy storage compound (battery energy storage system), c. 130 ha, Cornacarta, Doonacurry, Foygh, Kilcommock Glebe, Ledwithstown and Tirlickeen, Co. Longford.
Applicant: Foigha Solar Farm Limited · Council reference: 24/60325 · An Coimisiún Pleanála case: PL-500085-LD · Prepared 02 October 2026
What this document is. An independent analysis of the further information lodged by the applicant on 12 August 2026 in response to An Coimisiún Pleanála's request of 27 February 2026. It was prepared from the applicant's published documents and the public file, without the involvement of the applicant or the planning authority.
Disclosure. It was prepared for a participant in the appeal, who is an objector to the development. It is independent of the applicant and the planning authority; it is not independent of the appeal.
Scope. All 16 documents lodged with the further information (381 pages) were read in full, together with the Commission's request and the council file. The response was tested against each item the Commission asked for.
Findings. 35 points are set out in full below, each with the applicant's own words and the page they come from, followed by a table of the Commission's request against the response (Appendix A) and a list of the documents referred to (Appendix B).
How to read this document
Each point is set out in two parts: what the response says, in the applicant's own words with a PDF page reference, and why it falls short of what the Commission asked.
The points describe gaps in the response; they do not forecast the Commission's decision.
Contents
- 1. Summary
- 2. Scope of this analysis
- 3. Item 1(a): Fire Risk Management Plan
- 4. Item 1(b): Emergency Response Plan
- 5. Item 1(c): Firefighting water, firewater storage and drainage
- 6. Item 1(d): Appropriate Assessment Screening and Natura Impact Statement
- 7. Item 1(e): Changes to the proposal and documents not updated
- 8. Item 1(f): Public water supply and Uisce Éireann
- 9. Item 2: Archaeology
- 10. How the Commission has dealt with the same issues elsewhere
- 11. Information still outstanding
- Appendix A: The Commission's request, item by item, against the response
- Appendix B: Documents referred to
1. Summary
1.1 On 27 February 2026 the Commission asked the applicant for a Fire Risk Management Plan and an Emergency Response Plan for the battery compound; details, drawings, agreements and calculations on firefighting water, firewater storage and drainage; a revised Appropriate Assessment Screening report and Natura Impact Statement; updated application documents; liaison on the public water supply; and archaeological test trenching. The response was lodged on 12 August 2026.
1.2 Substantial material was lodged, and the applicant's consultants recorded many open items candidly. In this review's reading, the response falls short of the request in these main respects:
- No drainage or firewater retention calculations are provided; the Commission's stated water quantity is not addressed; the water source is not named; and no agreement with any body is lodged.
- The fire documents are outlines: 106 entries in the Fire Plan are to be confirmed, the Emergency Plan has 14 open items, and the consultant's own recommendations on the suppression agent, explosion relief panels and a toxic plume study await decisions.
- On the reviewer's measurement, the eastern hydrant is about 17 m from the nearest battery container, not more than 40 m as stated.
- The list of receptors within 1 km omits the permitted holiday lodge site (Longford County Council reg. ref. 24/5).
- The Natura Impact Statement rests its firewater conclusion on design proposals that are not final, and lists no operational mitigation.
- The EIA Screening and other documents were updated only in part.
- Fifteen of 144 planned test trenches were not dug, including, on the reviewer's plotting, four of the six in the battery compound; they are proposed to be dug only after permission.
1.3 Section 10 records how the Commission dealt with similar issues in ABP-321420-24, including where that decision does not assist the points made here.
1.4 Taken together, these gaps leave the application exposed to a further request for information and, if they are not resolved, to refusal on the information before the Commission. Section 11 lists the information that would resolve them.
2. Scope of this analysis
2.1 This analysis addresses the documents lodged by the applicant on 12 August 2026 in response to the Commission's request of 27 February 2026 (case PL-500085-LD). It is confined to those documents, read against that request, and refers to other material only where it bears on them. The Commission's case page was last checked on 2 October 2026.
2.2 The following short names are used:
- ACP Request: the Commission's letter to HW Planning of 27 February 2026 requiring further information under section 132.
- Cover Statement: HW Planning's letter of response to the Commission dated 11 August 2026 (10 pages).
- Fire Plan: the report titled Foigha Battery Energy Storage System, Outline Battery Safety Management Plan, Cairn Risk Consulting, document no. 0381-R-01, version 2.0, dated 26 June 2026 (59 pages). It is the document lodged in answer to the request for a Fire Risk Management Plan.
- Emergency Plan: the report titled Foigha Battery Energy Storage System, Outline Emergency Response Plan, Cairn Risk Consulting, document no. 0381-R-02, version 2.0, dated 7 July 2026 (40 pages).
- EIA Screening: the updated report titled Environmental Impact Assessment Screening, dated August 2026 (42 pages).
- NIS: the revised report titled Natura Impact Statement, Foigha Solar Farm, Co. Longford, Greenleaf Ecology, dated 11 August 2026 (106 pages), including the Appropriate Assessment Screening report at its Appendix A.
- Archaeology Report: the report titled Archaeological Impact Assessment, John Cronin & Associates, dated August 2026 (109 pages).
- Standard Details: the five Typical Detail Drawings lodged together as one file. Its PDF page 1 is Detail Drawing No. 10 (Battery Energy Storage System Container Detail), page 3 is Detail Drawing No. 13 (the water storage tank) and page 4 is Detail Drawing No. 14 (Water Attenuation Pond and Soakaway Area).
- Fire Service Emails: the emails of 17 and 30 June 2026 from Cairn Risk Consulting to the fire service of Longford County Council (2 pages).
- Drawing LD.FGHA-SLR 1.11: the revised drawing titled Site Layout Plan - Sheet Eleven, drawing no. LD.FGHA-SLR 1.11, scale 1:500. It shows the battery compound, the future substation, the water storage tank, the attenuation pond and the soakaway.
Appendix B lists each of these documents with its folder and file name among the further information documents on the Commission's case page.
2.3 Page references are to the PDF page numbers of the documents as lodged, not to printed page numbers. Quotations are word for word. In them, BayWa is the developer, Sungrow is the battery manufacturer, FRS is the fire and rescue service and OBSMP is the Fire Plan. Entries which the Fire Plan marks TBC are those it records as to be confirmed; the 14 entries in the Emergency Plan's HOLD register are referred to here as its open items.
2.4 Where a distance, count or volume is the reviewer's own measurement or reading of the applicant's drawings, figures or grid co-ordinates, this is stated. Such figures are approximate, and the applicant is invited to correct them. The reviewer offers no opinion on whether any technical standard is met; that is a matter for the Commission and its advisers.
3. Item 1(a): Fire Risk Management Plan
What the Commission asked
The Fire Risk Management Plan (FRMP) was to "set out preventative measures for potential causes of fire hazard and evaluate the associated risk of same" (ACP Request), to cover "the intended method(s) of extinguishment, and the installation of fire safety equipment and apparatus (fire alarms, detection systems, methods of suppression, etc.)" (ACP Request), and to "explicitly demonstrate how the potential risk of a fire occurring on the site would be addressed and minimised" (ACP Request). The Commission also noted "that BESS facilities may carry a risk of explosion" (ACP Request).
3.1 The suppression system and explosion relief are undecided
What the response says
The Fire Plan lists the product's standard system as fitted: "BESS is provided with an FK5112 clean-agent fire suppression system, activated through smoke/heat detection and controlled via the FACP." (Fire Plan, PDF p.43) The same plan states: "It is recommended that BayWa request that the product is provided without the FK5112 fire suppressant, as this increases the risk of explosion." (Fire Plan, PDF p.40) It adds: "It is recommended that the deflagration panels, which are an optional feature of the Sungrow PowerTitan 2.0, are opted for by BayWa." (Fire Plan, PDF p.40)
Why it falls short
No decision on either recommendation is recorded (the plan notes only that BayWa has asked Sungrow whether the product can be supplied without FK5112, Fire Plan, PDF p.36), and the Cover Statement mentions neither. The Commission is not told which suppression and explosion relief equipment it is asked to permit.
3.2 A fire alarm stops the gas-clearing fans and no restart is described
What the response says
"If a Level 2 Alarm is initiated (i.e., a fire is ongoing), the emergency ventilation system is shut down to prevent extensive ingress of oxygen to accelerate the fire." (Fire Plan, PDF p.34) The same alarm releases the FK5112 agent (Fire Plan, PDF p.44). The Emergency Plan warns that afterwards "Flammable gases may remain or continue to accumulate inside the container, creating a potential explosion/deflagration risk." (Emergency Plan, PDF p.16) The consultant asks the developer to confirm that "Deployment of the FK5112 would not override the explosion prevention system." (Fire Plan, PDF p.45)
Why it falls short
Neither document says whether or when the ventilation restarts; the control diagram shows the alarm stopping the fan, and the shutdown sequence is an open item (Emergency Plan, PDF p.17). No confirmation is lodged, so an interaction identified by the applicant's own consultant is unresolved.
3.3 Ventilation marked compliant while recording gas pockets at twice the quoted limit
What the response says
The Fire Plan quotes guidance that "Exhaust systems designed to prevent deflagration should keep the environment below 25% of the lower explosive limit (LEL)." (Fire Plan, PDF p.47) It marks the entry compliant because modelling shows the average concentration below that level (Fire Plan, PDF p.47). Three further entries, each marked compliant, add: "However, it must be noted that this is true for the average concentration, but there were pockets of gas which reached approx. 50% LFL in the container." (Fire Plan, PDF pp.48, 51 and 58)
Why it falls short
The plan does not reconcile the 25% figure with the 50% pockets, and the modelling report relied on (Fire Plan, PDF p.41) is not lodged. The reviewer does not suggest that the gas would ignite; whether the benchmark is met on an average is for the Commission's technical advisers.
3.4 Control building 15.7 m from the batteries; containers 0.90 m apart
What the response says
"The nearest occupied building to any battery container is approx. 15.7 m away, which is less than the minimum of 30 m recommended in the NFCC guidance." (Fire Plan, PDF p.37) The plan identifies it as a control building for the solar farm and marks the item "Not yet compliant" (Fire Plan, PDF p.26).
Why it falls short
The consultant recommends increasing the separation or, where that is not achievable, an assessment of the risk (Fire Plan, PDF p.37); the revised layout leaves the building in place and no such assessment is lodged. The reviewer measured 0.90 m between paired containers on Drawing LD.FGHA-SLR 1.11 (approximate; open to correction), against a minimum of 5 m in the Fire Safety Statement of December 2024. The fire test relied on for the smaller spacing was run at wind speeds of up to 3 m/s, which the plan notes may be exceeded on site (Fire Plan, PDF p.26), and its report is not lodged.
3.5 The plan says its compliance review is not a detailed risk assessment; 106 entries are to be confirmed
What the response says
"At this stage of project development, the design is not at a stage of maturity to have all risk reduction measures defined and implemented." (Fire Plan, PDF p.9) Of its compliance review the plan says: "This compliance review does not constitute a detailed risk assessment." (Fire Plan, PDF p.20)
Why it falls short
On the reviewer's count, the plan's assessment tables hold 106 entries marked TBC against 72 marked compliant (one of them spelt "Complaint", at Fire Plan PDF p.50); five of the TBC entries, and the one entry marked not yet compliant, are in its primary NFCC table (Table 3). The plan describes hazards and some consequences qualitatively and gives no site-specific estimate of likelihood; its view that nearby homes are not at significant risk rests on a generic distance rather than any modelling (Fire Plan, PDF pp.37-38), and it defers its hazard mitigation analysis to detailed design (Fire Plan, PDF p.51). On the plan's own account, the detailed evaluation of risk is still to come.
3.6 Vegetation clearance marked compliant, while the tree line across the battery strip is to be removed only under a separate application
What the response says
The Fire Plan marks as compliant that "3 m of BESS cabinets/enclosures are clear from combustible vegetation." (Fire Plan, PDF p.27) and repeats the entry at PDF p.29. The hedgerow removal described in the EIA Screening is for entrances, tracks and cabling (EIA Screening, PDF p.34); the only removal near the compound, 180 m for the future substation, is excluded from this application (EIA Screening, PDF p.10).
Why it falls short
Drawing LD.FGHA-SLR 1.11 draws an existing tree line, with trees labelled up to 15 to 18 m high, across the battery strip, and current aerial imagery, as inspected by the reviewer, shows a hedgerow with tall trees there. On that drawing the tree line lies within the outline annotated "c. 180m of existing hedgerow to be removed to facilitate the proposed substation compound - subject to a separate application process" (Drawing LD.FGHA-SLR 1.11), a removal which the EIA Screening leaves to the future substation application (EIA Screening, PDF p.10). The entries marked compliant therefore depend on tree removal that the response leaves to a separate application and does not assess. The reviewer does not say that particular trees overlap particular containers.
3.7 Other battery sites: marked compliant without mention of a second scheme nearby
What the response says
The Fire Plan marks as compliant the guidance that site selection consider external factors "including proximity of other BESS sites and the risk to the site from surface water flooding or spread from wildfire" (Fire Plan, PDF p.25). The EIA Screening lists case 501476, a solar farm and energy storage compound about 1.6 km from the site (EIA Screening, PDF p.20), and finds no cumulative operational impacts (EIA Screening, PDF p.39).
Why it falls short
The Fire Plan's justification deals with land use, wildfire and flooding and mentions no other battery site (Fire Plan, PDF p.25). Neither fire document, nor the fire and cumulative sections of the EIA Screening, considers the two compounds together. The reviewer does not suggest that fire could spread between the sites; the open question is whether fire service and water arrangements have been considered for both.
3.8 The battery product and the number of units are not fixed
What the response says
"For the purposes of this OBSMP, it is assumed the Sungrow PowerTitan 2.0 ST5015UX will be installed at the Foigha BESS." (Fire Plan, PDF p.13) The Emergency Plan lists as an open item: "Confirm the final installed configuration of the Foigha BESS, including the number and arrangement of battery containers, PCS units and auxiliary transformer stations." (Emergency Plan, PDF p.5) The fire service was told that the scheme was "proposed to include an approx. 180 MWh capacity lithium-ion Battery Energy Storage System (BESS)" (Fire Service Emails, PDF p.1).
Why it falls short
The fire documents' conclusions rest on tests of one product, which is assumed rather than confirmed. Drawing LD.FGHA-SLR 1.11 shows 32 battery containers. On the reviewer's arithmetic, at the capacity per container given in the Fire Plan's product table (5,015 kWh), 32 containers come to about 160 MWh, not the 180 MWh given to the fire service. Neither fire document states a container count or a total capacity for this site. The reviewer accepts that final procurement follows consent; the safety case nonetheless depends on a product and a quantity that are not yet fixed.
Why this matters before a decision
The Commission asked that the plan "evaluate the associated risk of same" (ACP Request) and "explicitly demonstrate how the potential risk of a fire occurring on the site would be addressed and minimised" (ACP Request). On the plan's own account the evaluation is incomplete, and its author's recommendations on suppression and explosion relief await the developer's decision. Those matters go to what would be built, not only to how it would be managed. The reviewer accepts that a final plan can be required by condition (section 10); points 3.1 to 3.4 and 3.8, however, are ones on which the Commission may wish to have the applicant's settled position before it decides.
4. Item 1(b): Emergency Response Plan
What the Commission asked
"It should outline a reactive strategy with clear procedures to follow in the event of a fire, detailing the specific actions the facility operator must take to respond quickly and effectively in the event of fire or similar emergency." (ACP Request) Under item 1(c)(ii), firewater storage and mitigation measures were to be carried into that plan: "Such measures shall be included in the ERP, as referred to in Item 2 above." (ACP Request)
4.1 No toxic plume study, so no basis for deciding whether neighbours evacuate or shelter
What the response says
Because receptor groups lie downwind, the Fire Plan's author states that "it is recommended to conduct a toxic plume dispersion study to inform detailed emergency response arrangements" (Fire Plan, PDF p.40). The Emergency Plan lists as an open item: "Complete BESS toxic plume dispersion modelling to confirm whether nearby receptors may need to evacuate or shelter in place during a BESS incident." (Emergency Plan, PDF p.5) The nearest residential group is listed at 174 m, downwind of the prevailing wind (Fire Plan, PDF p.32).
Why it falls short
The study that the applicant's own consultant recommends is not done, so the plan cannot say whether neighbours should evacuate or shelter; it says only to notify them "where required by incident scale, smoke/gas behaviour, and wind direction" (Emergency Plan, PDF p.32), with no defined trigger and no contact list, and the notification process is itself an open item (Emergency Plan, PDF p.5). No modelled off-site gas concentration, plume contour or exposure threshold appears in the response. The reviewer rests this point on the consultant's recommendation alone.
4.2 The receptor list omits the permitted holiday lodge site
What the response says
Both fire documents list "Receptors within 1 km of Foigha BESS" (Fire Plan, PDF p.32), and the Emergency Plan's notification step reads: "Notify Police service of the receptors located in 1 km radius." (Emergency Plan, PDF p.32) The Fire Plan marks as compliant the guidance to "Produce a plan that identifies all sensitive receptors within a 1km radius of the site." (Fire Plan, PDF p.24) The applicant's own NIS lists "Holiday Lodge Site (LCC Planning Ref: 24/5)" (NIS, PDF p.42), as does its EIA Screening (EIA Screening, PDF p.19).
Why it falls short
The permitted holiday lodge site (Longford County Council reg. ref. 24/5) is in neither receptor table. The reviewer measured it at about 620 m from the nearest part of the battery compound, to its north (lodge position from a map; compound position from the trench co-ordinates in the applicant's Archaeology Report; approximate, open to correction). On the applicant's own receptor map (Emergency Plan, PDF p.11), on the reviewer's reading, that position lies inside the 1 km circle, between the L1132 and the Royal Canal, and is shown as an open field with no receptor marker; the nearest marked groups are roughly 140 to 200 m from it. The plan's access map labels the Royal Canal Greenway and the L1132 (Emergency Plan, PDF p.19), yet neither is listed. Overnight guests at a permitted holiday site would therefore be missing from the only list of receptors that the plan provides for that step.
4.3 Containment measures are not carried into the Emergency Plan; treatment and disposal are open
What the response says
Besides the automatic valve at the pond outlet, the Fire Plan requires: "There shall be further provisions for a manual isolation valve which can be operated by first responders prior to the application of any firewater, as further assurance in case the automated valve does not actuate." (Fire Plan, PDF p.39) Detail Drawing No. 14 (the pond and soakaway drawing) shows one valve, labelled "Automated Shut-off Valve" (Standard Details, PDF p.4). The contractor, testing and disposal route for retained firewater are an open item (Emergency Plan, PDF p.4).
Why it falls short
The manual valve is on no drawing and is not in the Emergency Plan, which also omits the soakaway, the pond lining and the bund and gives no step if the automatic valve has not closed. No on-site treatment method is described; the Fire Plan says only that "A plan shall be developed with a local company to treat any water collected in the attenuation pond prior to disposal" (Fire Plan, PDF p.39), and the contractor and disposal route are open (Emergency Plan, PDF p.4). The reviewer does not say that these works could not be secured by condition; the plan that responders would use omits measures the Commission required it to contain.
4.4 No fire authority or other public body has reviewed the proposals
What the response says
The Cover Statement leaves matters to later agreement with, or inspection by, the fire authority in four places, for example: "The final design of management measures will be agreed with the Fire Authority ahead of construction." (Cover Statement, PDF p.5) It records: "At the time of writing, a response has not been obtained in respect of the proposals" (Cover Statement, PDF p.6). The Fire Plan states: "Consultation with the local FRS has not yet been completed." (Fire Plan, PDF p.22)
Why it falls short
The firefighting strategy gives the fire service specific tasks under plans on which it has not commented. On the council's file, the Chief Fire Officer was asked for a report on 2 January 2025 and the planner's report records that no comment was received; the council's decision has no condition on battery fire safety, firewater or compound drainage, only a general note that the applicant must ascertain and comply with the Chief Fire Officer's requirements. On the file as published, apart from the Commission's own request, no public body has commented on these proposals. The reviewer acknowledges that the applicant attempted contact twice and disclosed the position (5.2).
4.5 The plan is an outline; the operator and key details are not identified
What the response says
"This document is an outline ERP and provides a template for the detailed operational ERP that will be developed prior to commencement of operations of the Foigha BESS." (Emergency Plan, PDF p.7) Its 14 open items include to "Confirm the final ownership, operator and operational responsibilities for the Foigha BESS" (Emergency Plan, PDF p.4). The Fire Plan adds: "Onsite technical response times are to be confirmed once the operations team has been appointed." (Fire Plan, PDF p.44)
Why it falls short
The operator's part is described by job title only. The names and telephone numbers of the operator's staff, the control room and the manufacturer's representative are all to be confirmed (Emergency Plan, PDF p.24); the site address and muster points are open items (Emergency Plan, PDF p.4); and two of the operator's four initial actions in a battery fire apply only where possible or where available (Emergency Plan, PDF p.32). The specific operator actions the Commission asked to see depend on arrangements not yet made.
4.6 Both fire access routes use one entrance from the public road
What the response says
The Fire Plan marks access compliant because "There are two separate access roads entering from the east and west of the site, accounting for foreseeable wind conditions" (Fire Plan, PDF p.23), and refers on the same page to turning circles at both ends. The Emergency Plan describes primary access from the L1135 and "Secondary access via the internal access route around the southern side of the solar farm, entering the BESS area from the east." (Emergency Plan, PDF p.18)
Why it falls short
On the reviewer's reading of the applicant's Figure 11, both routes leave the public road at the same L1135 entrance, and the only fire appliance swept path lodged is one manoeuvre in Figure 12 (Emergency Plan, PDF p.19). On the reviewer's measurement from the applicant's layout drawings (approximate; open to correction), the secondary route shares the first 130 m or so of track with the primary route and then runs about 1.9 km around the southern panel field to the compound's east gate, against about 200 m for the primary route; it is drawn about 4 m wide, with four gates across it. No turning circle is labelled at either end of the compound on Drawing LD.FGHA-SLR 1.11. The reviewer does not say there is no second approach to the compound; the fire service has not reviewed the access (Fire Plan, PDF p.25).
4.7 The burn-out strategy does not address the neighbouring community
What the response says
"There will be no active firefighting attempt to extinguish a BESS container that is already alight." (Emergency Plan, PDF p.20) The plan explains: "This approach reflects the expected response to lithium-ion BESS fires in Guide 147 of the 2024 Emergency Response Guidebook (produced by the US Department of Transportation) [5]." (Emergency Plan, PDF p.20)
Why it falls short
The reviewer does not say the strategy is wrong in itself. Two of the third-party appeals objected that letting a battery fire burn out was not acceptable in a community setting. The response adopts that approach by reference to United States guidance without addressing that concern, and the consequence for neighbours is unassessed while the plume study is outstanding (4.1).
Why this matters before a decision
The Commission asked for "clear procedures to follow in the event of a fire" (ACP Request). Procedures for neighbours cannot be clear while the study that decides between evacuation and shelter is outstanding and a permitted holiday accommodation site within 1 km is missing from the receptor list. The Commission also said that firewater measures "shall be included in the ERP" (ACP Request); several are not. The reviewer acknowledges that in ABP-321420-24 an updated plan was left to condition and a justification for not modelling the plume was accepted (section 10). Here the applicant does not argue that no study is needed: its own consultant recommends one. The open items include who is to be warned, on what trigger, and how firewater is held, which bear on whether the plan can work at this location.
5. Item 1(c): Firefighting water, firewater storage and drainage
What the Commission asked
The Commission asked for "Details of the quantity and confirmation of how firefighting water will be sourced and/or retained within the proposed development site." (ACP Request) The quantity was to follow the NFCC guidance figure of "1,900 litres of water for 2 hours, as a minimum unless it can be demonstrated that another amount is appropriate" (ACP Request), with "Revised drawings and necessary agreements be provided to demonstrate feasibility of same." (ACP Request) It also asked for "a detailed methodology for fire water storage management" (ACP Request), and for drainage proposals "with associated calculations to be informed by the anticipated fire water requirements from the proposed development" (ACP Request) showing "suitable catchment, containment and on-site treatment measures" (ACP Request).
5.1 No drainage or retention calculations
What the response says
The Cover Statement says the pond sizing accounts for expected firewater and rainfall run-off (Cover Statement, PDF p.3). The Fire Plan says: "The volume shall be refined in detailed design to align for the maximum volume of firewater expected to be deployed during an incident and account for worst-case flood conditions." (Fire Plan, PDF p.24) Detail Drawing No. 14 (the pond and soakaway drawing) notes: "Infiltration testing to BRE 365 will be completed at detailed design stage of the soakaway." (Standard Details, PDF p.4)
Why it falls short
No calculation, rainfall figure, return period or catchment area for the pond or soakaway appears in the response. The only figure given in support of the 350 m³ pond is that it exceeds 180 m³, which is a water supply figure; the EPA guidance on firewater retention, to which the Commission referred, is not applied. On the reviewer's measurement from Detail Drawing No. 14 (approximate; open to correction), about 168 m³ remains above the level marked "Water Level @180,000 Litres" (Standard Details, PDF p.4), roughly 19 to 22 mm of rain on the compound. The reviewer does not say the pond is too small; its adequacy is not demonstrated.
5.2 No agreements are lodged
What the response says
The only correspondence lodged is two emails from the applicant's fire consultant to the Longford Fire Officer (Cover Statement, PDF p.10). The first, of 17 June 2026, says: "These documents can be shared with you upon request, and we welcome any comments on the proposed scheme following a review of these documents." (Fire Service Emails, PDF p.2) The second, of 30 June 2026, asks: "Please let me know if you would like these documents to be shared with you so you can provide any comments/feedback." (Fire Service Emails, PDF p.1)
Why it falls short
No agreement with any body is lodged. The emails mention no attachment and record no reply; both pre-date version 2.0 of the Emergency Plan, and the first was sent 110 days after the Commission's request. The tank capacity and hydrant requirements that agreements were to show to be feasible are instead left to later agreement with, or inspection by, the fire authority (Cover Statement, PDF p.4).
5.3 The Commission's water figure is not addressed
What the response says
"Provision is made for a water storage tank with a volume of 200m3 which exceeds the minimum 180m3 volume in the NFCC guidance." (Cover Statement, PDF p.3) The Fire Plan quotes the current edition of that guidance: "Where a flow of 25L/sec cannot be achieved, it would be prudent to provide an equivalent static supply of water on site that will provide for the same flow rate for a duration of 120 minutes." (Fire Plan, PDF p.28) It marks the achievable hydrant flow as still to be confirmed (Fire Plan, PDF p.27).
Why it falls short
The response reproduces the Commission's figure (Cover Statement, PDF p.3) but does not address it. It uses a different basis (25 litres per second for 120 minutes, or 180,000 litres, from the edition approved for publication in December 2025) without acknowledging that this differs from the Commission's figure or explaining why that amount is appropriate here. If the Commission's figure is 1,900 litres per minute, as in the first edition, two hours is 228,000 litres against a 200,000-litre tank. The reviewer does not say the tank falls short of the current guidance: the Commission's own figure is not addressed, and no demonstration is given for departing from it.
5.4 The eastern hydrant is drawn close to the batteries
What the response says
"The hydrants are located more than 40 m from the nearest BESS containers, allowing responders to access water from a safer position during an incident." (Emergency Plan, PDF p.22) The Fire Plan says the same of each hydrant (Fire Plan, PDF p.23). Responders are to stay "at least 30 m from the affected battery container" (Emergency Plan, PDF p.21).
Why it falls short
On the reviewer's measurement from Drawing LD.FGHA-SLR 1.11 at its stated scale of 1:500 (approximate; open to correction), the eastern hydrant symbol is about 17 m from the nearest battery container and about 11 to 12 m from the nearest transformer station. The applicant's Figure 13, drawn on an earlier layout, marks a hydrant at the corresponding position at the east end (Emergency Plan, PDF p.22). The western hydrant appears to be more than 40 m away. For one of the two hydrants, the drawings requested to demonstrate feasibility do not bear out the text, and it would lie inside the plan's own 30 m stand-off for a fire in the nearest containers.
5.5 Two hours of water, with no refill source
What the response says
The tank "will be filled manually ahead of the operational phase and maintained in situ" (Cover Statement, PDF p.4). Of the fire test on the proposed product, the Fire Plan records "The flames lasting for several hours in container A" (Fire Plan, PDF p.42) and "An explosion occurred 2.5 hours into the test" (Fire Plan, PDF p.56). It requires that "The situation shall be monitored for at least 24 hours after the initial fire has subsided, in case reignition occurs." (Fire Plan, PDF p.23)
Why it falls short
The reviewer accepts that the tank meets the two-hour minimum (about 2 hours 13 minutes at 25 litres per second) and that the water is for cooling neighbouring units, not for extinguishing the fire (Emergency Plan, PDF p.22). Beyond dedicated tanker access for filling (Cover Statement, PDF pp.3-4), the response does not say how the tank would be replenished during or after a longer incident, and the water source is itself an open item (8.1).
Why this matters before a decision
This item carries the Commission's most specific wording: "associated calculations" (ACP Request), "necessary agreements" (ACP Request) and drawings to "demonstrate feasibility" (ACP Request). On the lodged documents there are no calculations and no agreements, and one drawing contradicts the text. Each is a matter of fact that the applicant can supply. In ABP-321420-24 the equivalent figures were before the Commission when it decided (section 10). The reviewer does not suggest that the works could not be secured by condition; without the calculations, their adequacy cannot be assessed.
6. Item 1(d): Appropriate Assessment Screening and Natura Impact Statement
What the Commission asked
"Having regard to the plans and particulars prepared in respect of Item 1 (a) to (c) above you are required to submit a revised Appropriate Assessment Screening report and Natura Impact Assessment, which assess the potential adverse effects arising from the proposed development on European Sites located within the Zone of Influence." (ACP Request) A revised NIS was lodged, with a screening report at its Appendix A.
6.1 The firewater conclusion relies on a design that is not final, and the containment is not listed as mitigation
What the response says
The screening appendix states: "In the absence of mitigation, there is also potential for contamination of surface water and groundwater in the event of a fire/thermal runaway event as a result of firewater run-off and firefighting substances at the Energy Storage Compound during the operational phase." (NIS, PDF p.83) Two pages later it still records no potential for significant effects from water quality in the operational phase (NIS, PDF p.85). The NIS itself concludes: "In view of the above detailed design proposals, no adverse effects on the water quality within the Kiltaffrey stream and potentially in turn, Lough Ree SAC and Lough Ree SPA, are expected to occur in the event of a firewater event at the Energy Storage Compound." (NIS, PDF p.34)
Why it falls short
The proposals relied on are, on the fire documents' own words, still to be sized and demonstrated (5.1), and the Cover Statement leaves their final design to agreement with the fire authority (Cover Statement, PDF p.5). The Commission's request describes containment as mitigation, the screening appendix treats the firewater risk as arising "In the absence of mitigation" (NIS, PDF p.83), and the Fire Plan places part of the containment under the heading of mitigation measures (Fire Plan, PDF p.39). Section 7 of the NIS does not list it, and the NIS conclusion is conditioned on Section 7 alone (NIS, PDF p.55).
6.2 The route to ground through the soakaway is not assessed
What the response says
"During normal operations, any rainwater from the Energy Storage compound will drain to the attenuation pond and subsequently discharge by gravity to the rainwater discharge soakaway." (NIS, PDF p.34) On a fire: "In any unforeseen fire water management scenario, automated shut-off valves will be activated meaning no discharge of collected fire water to the soakaway." (NIS, PDF p.34) The NIS rates the area as of moderate to high groundwater vulnerability (NIS, PDF p.30).
Why it falls short
Keeping firewater out of the ground depends on the pond outlet being shut before contaminated water reaches it. The NIS mentions only the automatic valve, not the pond lining, the manual back-up valve or the check that drainage is isolated before water is applied. It does not assess failure or delay of the valve, or the reopening of the outlet after an incident. The soakaway's infiltration is untested (Standard Details, PDF p.4), no groundwater level is given, and the only distance given between the compound works and a watercourse is a general 10 m minimum set-back (NIS, PDF p.34).
6.3 No operational mitigation is listed for the valve on which the conclusion depends
What the response says
"No significant adverse effects have been identified during the operational phase, therefore no specific mitigation measures are required." (NIS, PDF p.51) Detail Drawing No. 14 shows "HDPE Lining" (Standard Details, PDF p.4) and a "1m high bund surrounding the entire perimeter of Attenuation Area" (Standard Details, PDF p.4), as well as the automated valve.
Why it falls short
The reviewer accepts that the valve, lining and bund are drawn, so that a condition tying the permission to the lodged drawings could secure their construction. What the NIS does not contain is any measure for how the automated valve is triggered, tested, maintained or backed up; the test frequency for drainage isolation is itself an open item (Emergency Plan, PDF p.38). A condition requiring the NIS mitigation measures to be implemented would therefore add nothing on firewater in operation.
Why this matters before a decision
The Commission asked for documents which "assess the potential adverse effects" (ACP Request) having regard to the fire and drainage particulars. The NIS acknowledges a pathway from the battery compound to Lough Ree SAC and SPA, and its conclusion on that pathway rests on design proposals whose sizing, testing and operation are deferred. The reviewer makes no submission on the legal standard, which is for the Commission as competent authority. The observation is that an assessment of the firewater scenario, including the route to ground and failure of the valve, is not in the NIS or elsewhere in the response. The screening outcome, that both Lough Ree sites proceed to full assessment, is not in issue.
7. Item 1(e): Changes to the proposal and documents not updated
What the Commission asked
"All other documentation submitted with the application should be reviewed and updated, where required, to address any amendments to the proposal which might arise in response to this request." (ACP Request)
7.1 The EIA Screening names fire risk but does not assess it
What the response says
The updated EIA Screening lists "Potential fire risk" (EIA Screening, PDF p.22) among possible impacts and, on major accidents, refers to the two fire plans (EIA Screening, PDF p.36). Its project description still reads: "The layout includes 38 no. grouped container modules housing electrical and control equipment for energy storage." (EIA Screening, PDF p.10) On water it says: "No potential impacts on land, soils, geology, surface water or groundwater during the operational phase of the proposed development are envisaged." (EIA Screening, PDF p.17)
Why it falls short
The screening does not itself describe or assess battery thermal runaway, explosion, smoke or contaminated firewater, or their pathways to the stream, groundwater or nearby homes; it relies on two plans that leave the matters in sections 3 to 5 open. The revised unit numbers appear only in a footnote, and the tank, pond and soakaway in a single bullet without dimensions or locations (EIA Screening, PDF p.12). It also attributes the NIS to a firm other than its author (EIA Screening, PDF p.30).
7.2 The scheme has changed: unit numbers, export capacity and compound surface
What the response says
"The number of energy storage modules has been reduced from 38 to 32, with the no. of transformers reduced from 10 to 8." (Cover Statement, PDF p.5) "The proposed solar farm will have a maximum export capacity (MEC) of 85MW." (Cover Statement, PDF p.2) The revised layout labels the battery area "Compound Hard Standing (Concrete)" (Drawing LD.FGHA-SLR 1.11), while Detail Drawing No. 10 (the container detail), revised on 11 August 2026, shows "untreated gravel mix, compacted and levelled" (Standard Details, PDF p.1).
Why it falls short
The 85 MW figure is not explained: the applicant's agent gave the council a figure of 82 MW in September 2025 (adding that the final capacity was subject to grid connection), and the planner's report proceeded on that figure. The two drawings disagree on the compound surface, and the Fire Plan separately requires the ground around the containers to be non-permeable (Fire Plan, PDF p.39). The reviewer does not say which surface is intended; the response does not settle it.
7.3 Supporting documents pre-date the changes
What the response says
Detail Drawing No. 14 adds a "130m long Stone Soakaway (Assumes stone voids of 40%)" (Standard Details, PDF p.4) under a revision noted as "Soakaway Added and Attenuation Area Revised" (Standard Details, PDF p.4), dated 6 August 2026. The Cover Statement says: "There are no changed circumstances in respect of noise impact assessment, ecological impact assessment, flood risk, or EMF/ EMC." (Cover Statement, PDF p.5) The NIS relies on the construction management plan lodged with the application (NIS, PDF p.48).
Why it falls short
Both fire reports pre-date the tank detail, the soakaway and the bund, and neither mentions the soakaway or the bund, although the Cover Statement says the drainage design had the fire consultants' input (Cover Statement, PDF p.4). The December 2024 flood risk assessment placed the compound outside the mapped flood extents, but it pre-dates the pond and soakaway, and no drawing shows either against those extents. The construction management plan dates from the council stage and describes a compound of about 48 battery units on a stone surface.
7.4 Text in both fire documents was changed after the stated issue dates, with no revision entry
What the response says
Each fire document is marked "Final for Issue" (Fire Plan, PDF p.2), the Fire Plan dated 26 June 2026 and the Emergency Plan 7 July 2026 (Emergency Plan, PDF p.2). The Emergency Plan as lodged reads: "A fire water tank volume of 200 m3 has been provided" (Emergency Plan, PDF p.22). The Fire Plan as lodged refers to "a one-way shut-off valve" (Fire Plan, PDF p.24).
Why it falls short
Each PDF file as lodged contains an earlier saved version of itself. In the earlier version the Emergency Plan gave the tank and the pond as plan areas only (approximately 196 m² and 400 m²), the Fire Plan left the tank volume to detailed design, and the valve was not described as one-way. The later version, in which 200 m³ and 350 m³ appear, carries a save date of 6 August 2026 in both files. Neither revision history records the change, and several entries marked compliant rest on the changed text. The reviewer draws no inference as to who made the changes or why, and asks only that the applicant confirm what was amended and when.
7.5 The re-advertised notice describes the development as originally applied for
What the notice says
The notice of further information, in the form set by the Commission, recites the original description (38 battery containers, 10 transformers and one spare parts container) and states that further information, including a revised NIS, was received and may be inspected.
Why it is raised
The notice does not mention the changes: the reduction to 32 containers and 8 transformers, the added spare parts and office containers, the 200 m³ water tank (4.42 m high), the hydrants, the lined and bunded attenuation pond and the 130 m soakaway. A member of the public reading the notice would not know of those works without inspecting the documents. The reviewer draws no conclusion from this and raises it for the Commission's consideration.
Why this matters before a decision
The Commission asked that other documents be "reviewed and updated, where required" (ACP Request). The EIA Screening's conclusion depends on fire documents that are themselves incomplete, and the flood and construction documents describe the scheme as it was before the tank, pond, soakaway and surface change. Each inconsistency can be corrected by the applicant. The applicant could correct each before the decision, so that the development assessed is the development permitted.
8. Item 1(f): Public water supply and Uisce Éireann
What the Commission asked
"Having regard to the need for large quantities of water in the event of a fire, you should liaise with Longford County Council and Uisce Eireann in relation to any proposed connection to the public water supply." (ACP Request) The capacity of the public supply, and any effects on supplies to nearby settlements, were to be assessed.
8.1 The source of the firefighting water is not identified
What the response says
"As outlined above, there is no requirement for direct access to the public water supply to support the proposed development." (Cover Statement, PDF p.6) The EIA Screening adds: "The operational energy storage system includes firefighting water storage, which will be sourced independent of local public water supply, with no impacts on the public network." (EIA Screening, PDF p.35) The Emergency Plan's open items include to "Confirm final firewater design, including tank volume, water source, hydrant flow rate" (Emergency Plan, PDF p.4).
Why it falls short
The reviewer accepts that this item was framed around any proposed connection and that none is proposed. The applicant's position depends, however, on the water coming from somewhere other than the public supply, and no document says where the initial 200 m³, or any refill, will come from. No contact with Uisce Éireann or the council's water services about firefighting water is recorded. The reviewer does not suggest that water would be drawn from a public main; the source is simply not stated.
Why this matters before a decision
The Commission raised this item "Having regard to the need for large quantities of water in the event of a fire" (ACP Request). Whether public supplies are unaffected cannot be confirmed until the source is named. A short statement from the applicant identifying the source and the refill arrangement would resolve the point.
9. Item 2: Archaeology
What the Commission asked
The Commission noted that "c. 51.2ha of site was not subject to a geo-physical survey" (ACP Request) and required a fieldwork-based assessment including "an examination of the proposed plans for development" (ACP Request). Test trenches were to be excavated "to determine the presence/absence of archaeological remains" (ACP Request). The reviewer acknowledges that a substantial programme was carried out, in which 129 trenches were dug and ten features were found and designed around.
9.1 Fifteen planned trenches were not dug and are deferred until after permission
What the response says
The programme "consisted of 144 trenches with a combined length of 8,240 linear meters" (Archaeology Report, PDF p.18). The report states: "There is a potential for archaeological features to remain undiscovered within the site" (Archaeology Report, PDF p.32), and recommends: "If An Coimisiún Pleanála grant planning permission, a supplementary programme of test trenching should be carried out to include the excavation of the 15 test trenches that were intended to be excavated during the recent programme of archaeological testing" (Archaeology Report, PDF p.33).
Why it falls short
On the reviewer's count from the report's trench table and trench records, at least 1,193 m of the planned 8,240 m (14.5%) was not dug, including nine of the 54 trenches aimed at geophysical anomalies (two because of an overhead power line and seven because of livestock), all in Cornacarta. The reviewer accepts that the reasons were practical. Presence or absence is nonetheless undetermined at those locations, and the report proposes to determine it only after permission.
9.2 Four of the six trenches in the battery compound were not dug; the new pond and soakaway are not addressed
What the response says
For the energy storage area the report says "six features of possible archaeological interest were identified; these were investigated by three targeted test trenches" (Archaeology Report, PDF p.20). Its record for Trench 87 reads: "This intended trench was not excavated because it was in too close proximity to an overhead powerline to be safely excavated." (Archaeology Report, PDF p.93) The entry for Trench 88 is the same (Archaeology Report, PDF p.94).
Why it falls short
On the reviewer's plotting of the report's trench co-ordinates onto Drawing LD.FGHA-SLR 1.11 (approximate, to about 5 m; open to correction), six planned trenches fall within the battery hardstanding: two were dug (86 and 89) and four were not (84, 85, 87 and 88); the south-east ends of undug Trenches 80 and 81, in the future substation area, also reach the strip. Two of the three anomaly trenches said to have investigated the features were therefore not excavated, although Figure 33 draws them as dug (Archaeology Report, PDF p.52). The new pond lies beside undug Trenches 84 and 85, and no trench was planned on the line of the 130 m soakaway (the tank stands on dug Trench 89). The report does not mention the tank, pond or soakaway, or say how Trenches 87 and 88 could be dug later given the power line.
9.3 No further geophysical survey; the Department's submissions are not addressed
What the response says
"Geophysical survey has been carried out over c.67% of the site area where development is proposed; the remaining areas were not suitable due to the terrain and ground conditions being unsuitable for the survey equipment." (Archaeology Report, PDF p.7) The undug trenches "had been included on the method statement that was submitted to, and approved by, the National Monuments Service" (Archaeology Report, PDF p.33).
Why it falls short
The reviewer accepts that the Commission asked for trenching, not further geophysics, and that the National Monuments Service approved the method. The Commission framed this item by reference to the Department's submissions of 22 January and 8 September 2025, which sought a full geophysical survey and intensive testing; the second said the information was not sufficient for an archaeological recommendation before a decision. The report does not refer to either submission, and nothing in the response shows that the Department has seen the results.
9.4 Avoidance of known features is not secured
What the response says
"As such, there will be no direct impact on the discovered archaeology." (Archaeology Report, PDF p.30) On the same page, of three burnt spreads that may continue into ground to be disturbed: "In these cases, there would be a direct and negative impact on the newly discovered features, but this would be ameliorated by their excavation and preservation by record." (Archaeology Report, PDF p.30) The report adds: "Buffers around these features have been included in the design, up to 10m where possible" (Archaeology Report, PDF p.33).
Why it falls short
The second statement is conditional, so the two do not conflict; but with the extent of three spreads unknown and excavation as the fallback, preservation in place is not secured. On the reviewer's reading of the report's Figure 10, the access track and a cable line pass through the 10 m buffer at Trench 1 (Archaeology Report, PDF p.30). The revised layout drawings show no labelled buffer, exclusion zone or fencing at the features; at most, small unlabelled circles mark them in the key plan on Drawing LD.FGHA-SLR 1.11. The reviewer accepts that a condition could require buffers to be shown.
9.5 What the 7,047 m total includes; features set aside without sampling
What the response says
"A total of 129 test trenches with a combined length of 7,047 meters were excavated" (Archaeology Report, PDF p.18). Of Trench 104, entered at 95 m: "The trench was paused after c.60m when it became deeper than 1.2m and was not safe to continue." (Archaeology Report, PDF p.98) Of trenches on bedrock: "the persistent bedrock encountered meant that a cleanly excavated trench was not possible" (Archaeology Report, PDF p.74).
Why it falls short
On the report's own records, the total includes 30 m credited for trial pits (Trenches 100, 106 and 108), about 35 m of Trench 104 that was not dug, and 831 m in Foygh (Trenches 18 to 29) where the record says that a clean trench was not possible or that archaeology would be difficult to identify. Burnt or cut features in anomaly Trenches 8 and 9 (Archaeology Report, PDF p.71), in anomaly Trench 72 and in Trench 142 were set aside on field opinion; no sample or date is reported. A burnt spread in Trench 63, also an anomaly trench, is in the trench record (Archaeology Report, PDF p.87) but absent from the findings, buffers and monitoring recommendations.
9.6 The stated reduction in panel area does not match the drawings
What the response says
"Provision of archaeological buffers to 10 no. areas providing for a reduction in panelled area of the proposed solar farm of c.404 sqm." (Cover Statement, PDF p.1) The Cover Statement relies on that reduction, saying that the reduction in panelled area and plant "will largely offset additional work needed for the creation of the attenuation tank and drainage soakaway" (Cover Statement, PDF p.6).
Why it falls short
On the reviewer's measurement, comparing the revised layout sheets with the December 2024 sheets (approximate; open to correction), the net area of panel tables removed at the buffers is about 4,100 m², roughly ten times the stated figure, and tables were removed at nine of the ten buffers. A figure of 404 m² corresponds to about three panel tables, which is the change at a single buffer. The change is small as a share of the whole scheme; the point is the accuracy of the applicant's description of its own revised design, which the EIA Screening and NIS repeat.
Why this matters before a decision
The Commission asked for trenching "to determine the presence/absence of archaeological remains" (ACP Request), although the council's decision already contained a pre-commencement archaeology condition. The reviewer recognises that archaeological testing is often completed under condition. Here the undug trenches are concentrated where the geophysical survey flagged anomalies and in the battery compound, the most intensively built part of the scheme, which now includes a pond and soakaway. Whether further layout changes are needed, as they were at ten other locations, cannot be known until those trenches are dug. The Department's view on the results would assist the Commission.
10. How the Commission has dealt with the same issues elsewhere
10.1 The applicant may rely on ABP-321420-24 (battery energy storage, Co. Roscommon, granted in March 2026). The reviewer has read the Inspector's Report, Order and Direction and that applicant's response documents on the council file. The Commission's own request letters in that case were not available to the reviewer; their terms are taken from that applicant's reproduction of them.
10.2 That decision does not assist the points made here in several respects. Permission was granted. Condition 5 left a final Fire Risk Management Plan and an updated Emergency Response Plan to be agreed before commencement, and the more detailed fire conditions recommended by the inspector were not attached. A second request, as that applicant described it, offered a choice between a dispersion model and a justification for not providing one, and the Order records that the Commission was satisfied with the justification given, based on the particulars of that application. No fire authority agreement appears on the published file in that case either. That applicant's emergency plan was shorter and more generic than the one lodged here, and the Fire Plan here is the more detailed technical document.
10.3 The cases differ in what was asked. As reproduced by that applicant, the Fire Risk Management Plan and Emergency Response Plan requests were in the same words as items 1(a) and 1(b) here. The request here goes further in express terms: it names a water quantity and asks for necessary agreements, associated calculations, on-site treatment, measures to be included in the emergency plan, and a revised Appropriate Assessment Screening report and NIS.
10.4 The cases also differ in what was provided. In ABP-321420-24, on the reviewer's reading, the applicant provided 360 m³ of stored firefighting water, which the inspector measured against a minimum of 228 m³; a feasibility letter from Uisce Éireann; and a lined battery compound draining to a precast concrete retention tank of about 565 m³ sized by calculation (a 100-year storm with a 10% climate allowance, plus the full firewater volume), with drainage calculations. It fixed its suppression system and explosion panels, and its containers were 4.5 m apart. The inspector recorded no connectivity with any European site. The Commission obtained an independent fire review and issued a second request before deciding. Here the response gives 200 m³ of water from an unnamed source, a 350 m³ pond with no rainfall basis, no drainage calculations, undecided suppression and panels, containers 0.90 m apart, an acknowledged pathway to Lough Ree, and a consultant's own recommendation that a plume study be done.
10.5 In PL26-500346 (Co. Wexford, granted in April 2026) the Commission permitted a battery scheme against its inspector's recommendation. Its reasons turned on the nature and scale of that scheme (about 0.15 ha and 7.3 MWh, in a business park), a strategy in which firefighting water would be exceptional, no off-site discharge, and no meaningful pathway to a European site. The present scheme differs on each of those factors, and the Commission has already asked here for the information described above.
10.6 On archaeology, the reviewer recognises that testing is frequently left to pre-commencement condition. In ABP-320662-24 (solar farm, Co. Galway) the Commission required geophysical survey and test excavation as further information; permission was granted after that work was done.
10.7 On the Natura Impact Statement, in ABP-311536-21 (a solar farm of about 148 ha with seven battery storage containers, Co. Meath, refused in August 2022) the Board's reasons for refusal included that the Natura Impact Statement was not based on the best available scientific information. The shortcomings identified there concerned survey extent and inaccuracies and were not the same as the points made in section 6. The decision is cited only to show that the adequacy of a Natura Impact Statement has been treated as a ground of refusal for a development of this type.
11. Information still outstanding
11.1 The response does not provide in full what the request of 27 February 2026 sought on the matters set out in sections 3 to 9. On the information now before the Commission, it may refuse permission or require the following before it decides.
11.2 The following would resolve the points made in this analysis:
- drainage and firewater retention calculations with their rainfall basis, and infiltration test results for the soakaway;
- the water quantity measured against the Commission's own figure, the water source and the refill arrangement;
- the fire authority's agreement to, or written views on, the plans as lodged;
- the applicant's decisions on the suppression system, explosion relief panels and ventilation control logic;
- the toxic plume study, with a receptor list that includes the permitted holiday lodge site (Longford County Council reg. ref. 24/5), the Royal Canal Greenway and the L1132;
- corrected drawings showing the hydrant positions, the manual isolation valve, the compound surface, the trees to be removed and the archaeological buffers;
- a revised NIS that assesses the firewater scenario, including the route to ground and failure of the valve, and lists the operational measures relied on;
- EIA Screening, flood risk and construction management documents that describe the scheme as now proposed;
- confirmation of the battery product, the number of containers and the installed capacity;
- confirmation of what was amended in the two fire documents after their stated issue dates, and when;
- excavation of the 15 outstanding test trenches, with the Department's view on the results.
Appendix A: The Commission's request, item by item, against the response
Gradings: provided; provided in part; deferred; not provided. Each reference is to the key page only.
| ACP item | What was asked | What was provided | Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1(a) | A Fire Risk Management Plan | Provided in part. An outline battery safety management plan; it states that the design is not yet mature. | (Fire Plan, PDF p.9) |
| 1(a) | Prepared by a suitably qualified expert | Provided in part. A specialist firm is named; no individual qualifications are stated. | (Cover Statement, PDF p.2) |
| 1(a) | Preventative measures and an evaluation of the risk | Provided in part. Hazards and measures are described; the plan states that it is not a detailed risk assessment. | (Fire Plan, PDF p.20) |
| 1(a) | Specific measures: flammable materials, method of extinguishment, fire safety equipment | Provided in part. Firefighting method stated; suppression system and explosion relief undecided. | (Fire Plan, PDF p.40) |
| 1(a) | Explicit demonstration of how the risk is addressed and minimised | Deferred. 106 entries to be confirmed; hazard mitigation analysis left to detailed design. | (Fire Plan, PDF p.51) |
| 1(b) | An Emergency Response Plan by a suitably qualified expert | Provided in part. An outline plan and template. | (Emergency Plan, PDF p.7) |
| 1(b) | Clear procedures and specific operator actions | Provided in part. A firefighting sequence and incident tables are given; the operator, contacts, site address, muster points and neighbour notification are open items. | (Emergency Plan, PDF p.4) |
| 1(c)(i) | Quantity and source of firefighting water | Provided in part. A 200 m³ tank is stated; the source is not named. | (Cover Statement, PDF p.3) |
| 1(c)(i) | Quantity to the stated NFCC figure unless another amount is demonstrated | Provided in part. A quantity is given against a different figure; the Commission's figure is not addressed. | (Fire Plan, PDF p.27) |
| 1(c)(i) | Revised drawings | Provided. The eastern hydrant position does not match the text. | (Drawing LD.FGHA-SLR 1.11) |
| 1(c)(i) | Necessary agreements | Not provided. Two emails; no reply. | (Cover Statement, PDF p.6) |
| 1(c)(ii) | Detailed methodology for firewater storage management, with mitigation | Provided in part. Tank, lined pond, valve, bund and soakaway are described and drawn; valve back-up, treatment and disposal are open. | (Standard Details, PDF p.4) |
| 1(c)(ii) | Measures included in the Emergency Response Plan | Provided in part. Drainage isolation and the pond are in the plan; the soakaway, lining, bund and manual valve are not. | (Emergency Plan, PDF p.22) |
| 1(c)(iii) | Drainage proposals with associated calculations | Proposals provided in part; calculations not provided. | (Fire Plan, PDF p.24) |
| 1(c)(iii) | Catchment, containment and on-site treatment, having regard to the stream and flood risk | Provided in part. Containment proposed; no on-site treatment method described; new works not shown against flood extents. | (Emergency Plan, PDF p.23) |
| 1(c)(iii) | Mitigation so that there is no contamination of surface or groundwater; downstream impacts | Provided in part. Pathway to Lough Ree identified; route to ground through the soakaway not assessed; infiltration testing deferred. | (NIS, PDF p.34) |
| 1(d) | Revised Appropriate Assessment Screening report and NIS | Provided in part. Both lodged; the firewater conclusion rests on design proposals that are not final; no operational mitigation listed. | (NIS, PDF p.51) |
| 1(e) | Other documents reviewed and updated | Provided in part. EIA Screening partly updated; flood risk assessment and construction management plan not revised. | (EIA Screening, PDF p.10) |
| 1(f) | Liaison with the council and Uisce Éireann on any proposed connection | Not provided. The applicant states that no connection is proposed. | (Cover Statement, PDF p.6) |
| 1(f) | Capacity of the public supply; effects on nearby settlements | Not provided, on the same basis; the water source is not named. | (EIA Screening, PDF p.35) |
| 2(a) | Fieldwork-based archaeological impact assessment by a qualified archaeologist | Provided. Licensed fieldwork (26E0518); the 15 outstanding trenches are dealt with under 2(b). | (Archaeology Report, PDF p.18) |
| 2(b) | Documentary and cartographic research; examination of the proposed plans | Provided in part. The new tank, pond and soakaway are not examined. | (Archaeology Report, PDF p.20) |
| 2(b) | Review of the completed geophysical surveys | Provided. | (Archaeology Report, PDF p.7) |
| 2(b) | Test trenching to determine presence or absence | Provided in part. 129 of 144 trenches dug; 15 deferred until after permission. | (Archaeology Report, PDF p.33) |
| 2(c) | Written report with an archaeological impact statement | Provided in part. The impact statement does not address the new tank, pond and soakaway, and omits the Trench 63 spread. | (Archaeology Report, PDF p.30) |
Appendix B: Documents referred to
All are among the Further Information Documents published on the Commission's case page for PL-500085-LD. Page references in this submission are to the PDF page numbers of these files.
| Short name used | Document | Folder on the case page | File name |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cover Statement | HW Planning letter of response, 11 August 2026 | Further Information Documents (top level) | 260811_Planning Cover Statement.pdf |
| Fire Plan | Outline Battery Safety Management Plan, document no. 0381-R-01, version 2.0, 26 June 2026 (Cairn Risk Consulting) | 4. Fire Risk | 0381-R-01_Foigha OBSMP_v2.0_Amended.pdf |
| Emergency Plan | Outline Emergency Response Plan, document no. 0381-R-02, version 2.0, 7 July 2026 (Cairn Risk Consulting) | 4. Fire Risk | 0381-R-02_Foigha BESS Emergency Response Plan_v2.0_Amended.pdf |
| Fire Service Emails | Emails of 17 and 30 June 2026 to the fire service of Longford County Council | 4. Fire Risk | Emails_Cairn to Longford CoCo FRS.pdf |
| EIA Screening | Environmental Impact Assessment Screening, August 2026 | 6. EIA Screening | 260811_EIAScreening_Foigha.pdf |
| NIS | Natura Impact Statement, 11 August 2026 (Greenleaf Ecology), with the Appropriate Assessment Screening report at its Appendix A | 5. Revised Appropriate Assessment_Natura Impact Statement | NIS Foigha_Final.pdf |
| Archaeology Report | Archaeological Impact Assessment, August 2026 (John Cronin & Associates) | 3. Revised Archaeological Impact Assessment | Archaeological Impact Assessment - Solar Energy Development, Foigha, County Longford.pdf |
| Standard Details | Typical Detail Drawings Nos. 10, 11, 13, 14 and 15 (five pages) | 2. Updated Standard Details | Foigha - TDD's - BESS, Traffo, Water Storage, Attenuation Pond & Office Contatiner (Rev001).pdf |
| Drawing LD.FGHA-SLR 1.11 | Site Layout Plan - Sheet Eleven, scale 1:500 | 1. Revised Site Layout Plans | 20260807_FGHA-SLR-RFI-LD.FGHA-SLR 1.11.pdf |
| ACP Request | The Commission's letter of 27 February 2026 requiring further information | Issued by the Commission | Not among the lodged documents |